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courts considering the question of whether students are entitled to fourth amendment protection have produced divergent and conflicting opinions. 5 In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 6 the Court for the first time directly addressed the issue of the fourth amendment's relationship to school searches. Unfortunately, the Court's opinion in TL.O. will probably only serve to compound the confusion already existing among state and federal courts concerning the constitutional validity of searches conducted by school officials. Instead of applying the traditional fourth amendment standard of probable cause to assess the validity of a search of a student's purse conducted by an assistant principal, shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
As the language above suggests, the fourth amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 322 (1966) . The Supreme Court has incorporated the warrant and probable cause language of the fourth amendment into the reasonableness requirement. See Note, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 856, 859 (1979) . Consequently, the Court has held that a search conducted without a warrant is "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) . This Note will closely examine the Court's focus on probable cause in assessing the reasonableness of searches as well as the few exceptions to the probable cause requirement. 5 An analysis of the case law indicates that there are at least six approaches employed by courts addressing the issue of the fourth amendment's relationship to public schools. First, some courts have held that because school officials are exercising parental authority over children while they are in school, school officials are private individuals exempt from the dictates of the fourth amendment when they conduct searches in the public schools. (1975) . Fifth, one court has held that the traditional probable cause standard applies in public school searches which are highly intrusive. See M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1979 ). Finally, a majority of the courts have held that although the fourth amendment applies to searches conducted in the public schools, the constitutional validity of these searches should be measured by a standard less demanding than probable cause. See, e.g., Helliner v. Lund, 438 F. Supp 6 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) .
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
the Court announced a new standard derived by balancing the school official's interest in maintaining an educational environment against the student's expectations of privacy. 7 Based on a balancing of these interests, the Court announced that a search of a student by a teacher is constitutional "when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." ' 8 The Court's balancing test for school searches departs from the "long-prevailing" view that "probable cause embodied 'the best compromise that has been found for accomodating [the] often opposing interests' in 'safe-guard [ing] citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy' and in 'seek[ing] to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection."' 9 Although the Court has recognized a few exceptions to the requirement that fourth amendment searches and seizures must be based on probable cause, none of these exceptions covers a full-scale search of a student to discover evidence of a minor school violation. 10 This Note examines the Court's decision to depart from the traditional probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment and derive a standard for school searches based on a balancing of the relevant interests. 1 1 The Note argues that the balancing test used by the Court carves out an unprecedented exception to the traditional probable cause standard that will cause confusion among school administrators, as well as courts, and lead to unjustified searches of students. 12 The traditional fourth amendment standard of probable cause, when accompanied by the few isolated exceptions where probable cause is not required to make a search, adequately protects both the school official's interest in preserving an educational environment and the student's expectations of privacy.' States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) ) . 10 See infra text accompanying notes 118-20. 11 See infra text accompanying notes 81-38. 12 See infra text accompanying notes 140-60. 13 See infra text accompanying notes 161-83.
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other girl smoking in a lavatory.' 4 T.L.O. was a fourteen-year-old freshman at that time. 15 Although the possession of cigarettes was not a violation of school rules, smoking in the lavatory was prohibited.' 6 Consequently, the teacher escorted the two girls to a meeting in the principal's office with the Assistant Vice Principal, Mr. Theodore Choplick.' 7 At the meeting with Mr. Choplick, T.L.O.'s companion admitted that she had violated the school rule prohibiting smoking in the lavatory.' 8 T.L.O., however, denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at all. Mr. Choplick moved T.L.O. to his private office and demanded to see her purse. When the school official opened up the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes. Mr. Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers while reaching into the purse for cigarettes. Knowing that rolling papers are often associated with marijuana use, the school official continued to search the purse thoroughly. This search revealed a small amount of marijuana, marijuana paraphernelia, a large sum of money, and two letters indicating that T.L.O. was involved in marijuana dealing. 19 Mr. Choplick turned all of the evidence of the drug dealing over to the police.
T.L.O. and her mother later proceeded to police headquarters where T.L.O confessed to selling marijuana in the high school. On the basis of T.L.O.'s confession and the evidence obtained from her purse, the State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in juvenile court. 20 T.L.O. moved to suppress her confession to smoking in the lavatory contending that Mr. Choplick's search of her purse violated the fourth amendment. 2 1 The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress. In determining whether Mr. Choplick's search was reasonable, the court applied the standard that a school official may conduct searches based on a reasonable belief that a crime has 19 Id. Specifically, Mr. Choplick's search revealed "a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two letters that implicated T.L.O. in marijuana dealing." Id.
20 T.L.O. also received a three-day suspension from school for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area and a seven-day suspension for possession of marijuana. Id. at 737 n. The Supreme Court of New Jersey approved the standard used by the juvenile court to determine whether Mr. Choplick's search violated the fourth amendment. 2 4 The court, however, with two justices dissenting, reversed the juvenile court's conclusion that, under the standard, the search of the purse was reasonable. 2 5 The court stated that since possession of cigarettes did not violate school rules, Mr. Choplick's desire to obtain evidence that would impeach T.L.O.'s claim that she did not smoke did not justify his search. Consequently, the court ordered suppression of the evidence found in T.L.O.'s purse; the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule prevented the use in juvenile proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by school officialsY 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to de- 22 The full statement of the standard applied by the juvenile court was as follows:
[A] school may properly conduct a search of a student's person if the official has a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school policies. IowA L. REv. 739, 742 n.20 (1974) ("mhe need for a deterrent to unreasonable searches by the police is as strong when children are the victims as when adults are, and the fact that the children are confined in school when the search is conducted would seem to make the need greater rather than less.").
28 105 S. Ct. at 788. Although certiorari was granted to decide the issue of the appropriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings for unlawful searches, the Court stated that the remedy issue should not be decided without considering the limits, if any, the fourth amendment imposes on school officials and ordered argument on that question. Id. The Court's opinion ultimately did not address the question whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained from unlawful searches conducted by school officials because the Court found Mr. Choplick's search to be lawful. In fact, the Court noted that "our determination that the search at issue in this case did not violate the fourth amendment implies no particular resolution of the question of the applicability of the exclusionary rule." Id at 739 n.3. The Court's decision to to consider the appropriate fourth amendment standard, even though certiorari was granted only to determine the applicability of the exclusionary rule, was influenced by the struggle of state and federal courts considering the constitutional validity of school searches. 
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the argument that school officials are exempt from the fourth amendment because they are exercising parental rather than state authority.3 2 This view, the Court found, "is in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court.1 3 3
After holding that the fourth amendment applies to searches conducted by school officials, the Court then announced the fourth amendment standard governing searches in public schools. The Court held that a school official is justified in conducting a search "when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence" that a law or school policy has been violated by a student. 34 To arrive at this standard, the Court balanced the interest of school teachers and administrators in maintaining an educational environment against the students' legitimate expectations of privacy. 3 5 The Court employed a balancing test to determine a reasonableness standard for searches conducted in public schools because several Supreme Court cases have recognized the validity of searches based on standards less demanding than probable cause when a compelling governmental interest outweighed the intrusiveness of the search involved. 36 Consequently, the Court stated that adopting a standard for searches conducted in public schools that is less demanding than probable cause was justified by the substantial need of school officials to maintain order in the schools. 3 7 The previous cases upholding the applicability of the fourth amendment to public officials, see infra text accompanying notes 66-69. 32 105 S. Ct. at 741. 33 This argument was not raised by the State of New Jersey, which conceded that public school officials are state agents for purposes of the fourth amendment. See id. at 740. However, it was addressed by the Court because several federal and state courts had held that the special relationship between school officials and students exempts school officials from the dictates of the fourth amendment. Id. The Court, referring to the Tinker and Gault decisions stated that "[i]f school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting searches of their students." Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 70-80. 34 The full standard stated by the Court was that "(a] search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." Id. This standard will be referred to as the "reasonable grounds" standard in this Note. The Court dearly limited this standard to searches carried out by school authorities acting alone. The appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with law enforcement officers was not addressed by the Court. 
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Court also added that a search satisfying this standard "will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." 38 The Court applied the "reasonable grounds" standard to the facts and held that Mr. Choplick's search was reasonable for fourth amendment purposes. 3 9 The Court stated that Mr. Choplick's search for cigarettes was reasonable since evidence of cigarettes in T.L.O.'s purse, although not conclusive of the charge that she had been smoking in the lavatory, "would both corroborate the report that she had been smoking and undermine the credibility of her defense to the charge of smoking." 40 The Court then indicated that the further search for marijuana when the school official saw a package of rolling papers in T.L.O.'s purse was also reasonable because the discovery of rolling papers gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had marijuana as well as cigarettes in her purse. Thus, the Court held that the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to exclude the evidence from T.L.O.'s juvenile delinquency proceeding on fourth amendment grounds was erroneous.
B. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS
According to a concurring opinion written by Justice Powell, with whom Justice O'Connor joined, the Court should have placed greater emphasis on the special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools in reaching the conclusion that students are not entitled to the same constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in non-school settings. 4 2 Justice Powell stressed that due to the compelling interest of teachers in maintaining an educational atmosphere and the lack of an adversarial relationship between easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems." Id. at 742.
38 Id. at 744. The Court included this limitation on the scope of school searches to satisfy the requirement that searches must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interfence in the first place." See Terry v. Ohio, 592 U.S. 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW teachers and students, constitutional rules do not apply "with the same force and effect in the schoolhouse as [they do] in the enforcement of criminal laws." 43 Consequently, Justice Powell maintained that the Court was justified in adopting a fourth amendment standard less demanding than the probable cause standard granted to adults and children in non-school settings.
In addition to the concurring opinion ofJustice Powell, Justice Blackmun separately concurred in the judgment of the Court. Justice Blackmum stated that in adopting the "reasonable grounds" standard, the Court should have stressed that the use of a balancing test is an exception to the traditional probable cause standard justified by the substantial need of school officials to maintain order in the public schools. 4 4 Although Justice Blackmun agreed with the standard formulated by the Court, he stated that only when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement" made the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, was a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers. 4 5 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun concluded that "the special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety of school children and teachers or the educational process" warranted use of the "reasonable grounds" standard derived from a balancing test. The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, agreed with the Court's holding that the fourth amendment applies to searches conducted by public school officials. 47 The dissent, however, disagreed with the Court's use of a balancing test instead of the traditional probable cause standard. The dissent noted that in the Court's past decisions, probable cause had been a prerequisite for a full-scale search. 48 The Court's only Justice Stevens also argued that, even if the issue of the fourth amendment standard for school searches was before the Court, the Court misapplied the standard of reasonableness embodied in the for accomodating the opposing interests of enforcing the law and protecting the citizens from unreasonable searches.").
49 105 S. Ct. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police officers may "frisk" suspects who they reasonably believe to be dangerous).
50 Id. The Court should have focused on the warrant and probable cause requirements because Mr. Choplick's search "encompassed a detailed and minute examination of T.L.O.'s purse, in which the contents of private papers and letters were throroughly scrutinized."
51 Id. The dissent stated that the unconstitutionality of Mr. Choplick's decision to continue to rummage through T.L.O.'s purse after finding rolling papers made it unnecessary to consider whether the initial search by Mr. Choplick was valid. Id.
52 Id. at 759, 760 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 53 Id. at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, the applicability of the exclusionary rule in public schools was the only issue in the case because the State of NewJersey had properly declined to submit to the Court the purely factual dispute of whether Mr. Choplick's search violated the fourth amendment. 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW fourth amendment. Justice Stevens noted that the "reasonable grounds" standard adopted by the Court would permit teachers to search students for evidence when even the most trivial school regulation had been violated. 55 To prevent such an infringement on students' privacy, Justice Stevens proposed a standard that "would permit teachers and school administrators to search a student when they have reason to believe that the search will uncover evidence that the student is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the educational process." 56 Based on this standard, Justice Stevens concluded that the forcible opening of T.L.O.'s purse was unconstitutional at its inception because a smoking infraction "was neither unlawful nor significantly disruptive of school order or the educational process .... -57
The T.L. . decision is flawed in several respects. First, although the Court initially stressed the importance of students' rights to privacy in holding that the fourth amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by school officials, the Court then minimized the fourth amendment protection afforded to students by using a balancing test to carve out an unprecedented exception to the probable cause standard for full-scale searches conducted in public schools. 58 Second, even if the balancing test employed by the Court was warranted by traditional fourth amendment analysis, the "reasonable grounds" standard adopted by the Court will promote unjustified searches in public schools since the privacy rights of students were not given adequate weight in the Court's balancing of the relevant interests. 59
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES TO SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY SCHOOL OFFICIALS
In holding that the fourth amendment applies to searches conducted by school officials, the Court first disposed of the argument that the fourth amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures conducted by law enforcement officers. 60 Although the 55 Id. at 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (relaxed standard adopted by the Court "will permit school administrators to search students suspected of violating only the most trivial school regulations and guidelines for behavior.").
56 Id. at 763 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Thus, the fact that the Framers did not intend for the fourth amendment to constrain the actions of school officials does not preclude the fourth amendment from being a safeguard of the rights of students today. Historically, the only types of searches which the Court has placed outside of the requirements of the fourth amendment are those conducted by private individuals with no state connections.64
The "origin and history [of the fourth amendment] show that it was intended as a restraint upon the actions of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies." ' 65 Consequently, the fourth amendment has been held to restrict the actions of housing inspectors, 6 6 OSHA inspectors, 6 7 and firemen. 68 Furthermore, the requirements of the fourth amendment apply to state actors because the Supreme Court has ruled that any fundamental rights protected from federal action by the fourth 61 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (fourth amendment was created by men who remembered "[t]he practice... in the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods" without any check on the actions of the officers 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW amendment are also protected from state action under the fourteenth amendment. 69 Thus, the Court's conclusion in the present case that school officials in public schools, who are employees of the state, are subject to the fourth amendment is consistent with the fourth amendment's purpose of safeguarding the privacy of individuals against unreasonable searches by all public officials, not only those conducted by law enforcement officers.
In extending the fourth amendment to searches conducted by school officials, the Court also strongly rejected the reasoning of some courts "that school officials are exempt from the dictates of the fourth amendment by virtue of the special nature of their authority over school children." 70 These courts have used the in loco parentis theory, which proposes that school officials stand in the place of the students' parents while the students are in school, to hold that school officials conducting searches are not restricted by the fourth amendment because they are merely acting in place of the parents for the purpose of protecting the welfare of students, not as government agents for the purpose of obtaining a criminal conviction. 7 1 The philosophy underlying the in loco parentis theory is that since a school official exercises parental authority, he is vested with the parents' rights, duties, and responsibilities to protect the students' health. 72 The in loco parentis theory has been effectively used by courts to negate the fourth amendment protection of students. The parent may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of power of the parent committed to his charge, viz that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed. 12 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 453.
71 See, e.g., In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969). In the Donaldson case, the court held that the in loco parentis theory justified a search by school officials of a student's book locker. Id. at 513, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 223. The school officials, who searched the student's locker after receiving a tip that the student had been selling drugs in the school, found marijuana in the locker. The court indicated that the school official was simply following his obligation "to maintain discipline in the context of a proper and orderly school operation" and not acting as "a governmental official within the meaning of the fourth amendment." Id. at 511, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
72 See generally S. DAVIS, RIGrs OF JUVENILES, THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM 1.1 (1980 Second, the Court's argument that the in loco parentis theory is no longer a realistic doctrine is supported by the significant changes in public schools over the past fifty years. Teachers today usually have many students in each class and therefore rarely form close relationships with students on an individual basis. The days of the small one-room school-house where teacher and students spent the entire day together are gone. 78 The increasingly impersonal nature of schools makes the theory that school officials act as students' surrogate parents untenable.
Finally, even in schools which have retained a personal atmosphere, the responsibilities of teachers differ from those of parents. School officials are employed to educate children and to formulate school curriculum for all the students, not to serve the interest of individual students. 7 9 Moreover, "the literal translation of in loco parentis means "in the place of the parent" and yet it can hardly be argued that a parent would search his child, have him arrested, and turn over the evidence to the police to be used in criminal proceedings." 8 0 School officials do not show the genuine parental protec- 79 See Buss, supra note 27, at 768 (in loco parentis theory is erroneous phrase in school context because courts using in loco parentis theory focus "almost entirely on protection of the other students and on coercive power over the searched student" instead of "parental protective concern for the student who is threatened with the school's power."). 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW tion and concern underlying the in loco parentis theory. Thus, since the in loco parentis theory is concerned with the protection of children, using the theory to exempt school officials from the fourth amendment requirements when searching students is untenable.
B.
USE OF A BALANCING TEST TO DERIVE A "REASONABLE GROUNDS"
STANDARD
While correctly holding that the fourth amendment applies to searches conducted by school officials, the Court seriously erred in minimizing the extent of privacy afforded to students by adopting a "reasonable grounds" standard for searches conducted in public schools. In adopting the "reasonable grounds" standard, the Court stated that "the determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires 'balancing the need of search against the invasion which the search entails."' 8 1 The Court's use of a reasonableness standard derived by a balancing of the relevant interests, however, is at odds with the "long-prevailing" probable cause standard for fourth amendment analysis. found to be invalid under the fourth amendment because school officials were not "particularized with respect to which students might possess the money."). 
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search conducted without a warrant based on probable cause is per se unconstitutional unless it falls within one of the "specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. 8 6 Consequently, unless the policy reasons behind these isolated exceptions also apply to searches conducted by school officials, the Court should have extended the probable cause standard to students in public schools.
In announcing the "reasonable grounds" standard determined by balancing the relevant interests, the Court primarily relied on two previous decisions in Camara v. Municipal Court 8 7 and Terry v.
Ohio.
8 8 In both of these cases, the Court carved out an exception to the traditional probable cause standard by using a balancing test to derive a standard less demanding than probable cause. 8 9 The Court cited these cases for the proposition that searches may be excepted from the warrant and probable cause requirement when "a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a fourth amendment standard of (seizure of car in drive way was not justified under the "emergency" or "plain view" exceptions because police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant and no contraband or dangerous objects were involved). The circumstances under which the Supreme Court has permitted searches based on less than probable cause, as summarized by one state court, are as follows:
(1) Where the arresting officer has reasonable cause to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous person, he may "stop and frisk" him for a weapon. 
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reasonableness that stops short of probable cause." 90 An analysis of the Camara and Terry decisions, however, reveals that the relaxed fourth amendment standards adopted in these cases were isolated exceptions limited to the particular facts involved and do not stand for the rule that courts may always adopt a reasonableness standard for searches in different contexts.
In Camara, the Court held that a housing inspector making a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the city's housing code could not undertake an inspection inside the petitioner's residence without a warrant. 9 ' Nevertheless, the Court held that the standard of probable cause controlling issuance of a warrant could be lower than that applying in the case of a search for evidence of a criminal violation. 9 2 The Court indicated that a modified probable cause standard was necessary in the context of housing inspection because "the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented .... ."93 Housing inspectors would not be able to satisfy this public interest if the validity of searches were assessed by the traditional probable cause standard. Furthermore, the Court stated that housing inspections are "neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime" and "involve a relatively limited intrusion of the urban citizen's privacy."
' 94 After taking these factors into consideration, the Court held that probable cause would be established "if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling." 9 5 In citing Camara for the general proposition that a balancing test may be used to develop a fourth amendment standard for school searches, the T.L.O. Court ignored several important aspects of the Camara decision. First, the Court in Camara held that in the special case of housing inspections, probable cause, not reasonableness, would be determined through a balancing test weighing the 95 Id. at 538. The Court indicated that instead of lessening the overall protections of the fourth amendment, the standard adopted "merely gives full recognition to the competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic principle behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy." Id. at 539.
[Vol. 76 914 governmental interest against the privacy right of the citizen. 9 Although probable cause was measured in a new manner, the Court's holding in Camara was consistent with the general principle that all searches and seizures are unreasonable unless based on probable cause. Thus, the T.L.O. Court's use of a reasonableness standard is contrary to Camara.
Second, the TL.O. Court employed the Camara balancing test without determining whether the policy reasons for using such a test in Camara also apply to a school search situation. The decision in Camara stressed that although the fourth amendment applies to administrative searches, the special factors peculiar to housing inspections required a relaxed standard of probable cause for search warrant purposes. 97 In other words, the impersonal nature of an inspection not aimed at discovery of evidence of a crime, made the search addressed in Camara a "relatively limited invasion" of privacy. 98 The natural inference from the Camara decision is that when these special factors are absent, not only must the administrative search be made under the authority of a warrant, but the issuance of the warrant is appropriate only under the traditional probable cause standard, rather than the relaxed standard of Camara. 9 9 Although initially the search of T.L.O.'s purse may seem to be a purely "administrative search" and thus indistinguishable from the search conducted in Camara, the facts in the present case do not show a limited intrusion of the kind associated with the relaxed standard of probable cause in Camara. To the contrary, the opening of T.L.O.'s purse was highly personal in nature. The Court itself recognized that "[a] search of a child's person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective The Court's reliance on Terry for its use of a balancing test to derive a fourth amendment standard for school searches is also incorrect. In Terry, a police officer seized a revolver by patting down the petitioner who, together with two other persons, had several times returned to stare in a store window for a few minutes.' 0 ' The Court recognized the narrow authority of a police officer to conduct a reasonable search for weapons when "he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime."' 1 2 The Court stated that a police officer is justified in making a "frisk" for weapons if "a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in his belief that, his safety or that of others was in danger."' 1 3 To arrive at this standard, the Court balanced the limited violation of the individual's privacy against the opposing interests of crime prevention and the police officer's safety.' 04 The Court concluded that a "frisk" amounts " 'to a mere minor inconvenience and petty indignity,' which can properly be imposed upon the citizens in the interest of effective law enforcement on the basis of police officer's suspicion."' 0 5 The Court warned, however, that the search must be "reasonably related in scope to the justification for its initiation."'
Since the Terry decision, the Supreme Court and lower courts have allowed limited intrusions of an individual's personal security based on less than probable cause by border guards 10 106 Id. at 29. The Court stated that the search "must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may accurately be characterized as something less than a 'full search. ' 1964 ). In Grisby, the court indicated that the fourth amendment is applied under a military law or in a military context in a unique and qualified fashion. See id at 654-55. The court held that the seizure of property from the home of a military officer on the basis of a report that the officer had stolen government property was constitutionally valid. Id According to the court, there was "no basis for holding that a search conducted by military authority, which was completely lawful and valid when made as a matter of military law, is unreasonable under the Constitution." Id. at 656. Consequently, the court held that the commanding officer who authorized the search performed the role of a magistrate in the civilian context. Id. 109 Buss, supra note 27, at 749. After analyzing the searches conducted at a border or under military authority, Buss concluded that neither of these special settings "provide a persuasive analogy for erosion of fourth amendment protection in the school setting. The Court's reliance on the Terry line of cases is faulty because the search conducted by Mr. Choplick of T.L.O.'s purse was intrusive and not justified by a compelling governmental interest. First, the Court's reasoning that the exceptions to the probable cause requirement announced in the Terry line of cases apply to school searches as intrusive as Mr. Choplick's search of T.L.O.'s purse "threaten[s] to swallow the general rule that fourth amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause." 1 18 Unlike the Terry line of cases, the search of T.L.O.'s purse was highly personal in nature. A purse usually contains personal items and "it could prove extremely embarrassing for a teacher or principal to traband implicitly includes limited authority to detain occupants of house while search is being conducted).
113 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-24. The Court stressed the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him." Id. at 23.
114 See Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-79. The Court stated that "aliens create significant economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal resident aliens for jobs, and generating extra demand for social services." Furthermore, the Court noted that the "aliens themselves are vulnerable to exploitation because they cannot complain of substandard working conditions without risking deportation." Id.
115 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
116 See Brigoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. at 211. 117 Nevertheless, as Justice Blackmun indicated in his concurring opinion in United States v. Place, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2652 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring), there "appears. . . to be an emerging tendency on the part of the Court to convert the Terry decision into a general statement that the fourth amendment requires only that any seizure be reasonable." For instance, in his opinion for the Court in Terry, ChiefJustice Warren identified "the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment" as "the reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." 392 U.S. at 19. Moreover, Justice White, concurring in Dunaway, noted that Terry is not "an almost unique exception to a hard-and-fast standard of probable cause." Instead, Justice White said that "the key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness-the balancing of competing interests." 442 U.S. at 219 (White, J., dissenting).
118 See Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213.
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SEARCHES BY SCHOOL OFFICIALS rummage through its contents, which could include notes from friends, fragments of love poems, caricatures of school authorities, and items of personal hygiene."
Furthermore, students such as T.L.O. do not lose their expectations of privacy upon entering a public school. Students, unlike soldiers subjected to military discipline or persons attempting to enter the country, do not voluntarily surrender their expectations of privacy. Even the Court recognized that students need to bring personal items to school and do not ''waive all rights to property in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds." 120 Thus, the Court incorrectly relied on the Teny line of cases because the exceptions from the warrant and probable cause requirements announced in these cases do not apply to searches as intrusive as Mr. Choplick's search of T.L.O.'s purse. In addition to ignoring the intrusive nature of the search involved, the Court also failed to adequately explain the compelling governmental interest that justified deriving a standard less demanding than probable cause for searches by school officials. The Court's only justification for departing from the traditional probable cause standard was "the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools .... 121 Although maintaining an educational environment is a very important interest for school officials, it does not justify the relaxation of the probable cause standard. There is certainly a difference between the difficulty in achieving the overriding security and safety needs in border searches or police investigations of dangerous criminals and satisfying the law enforcement interests that have prompted student searches in public schools. 22 Unlike school officials, border guards and police officers investigating dangerous criminals need a fourth amendment standard less demanding than probable cause to accomplish their interests. There is no way a border guard could obtain evidence of whether a person was attempting to bring drugs or dangerous weapons into the country if he needed probable cause to stop and briefly question persons crossing the border. Similarly, a police officer would be placed in serious danger if he needed probable cause to "frisk" a dangerous criminal. A school official, however, can achieve his interest of maintaining order in the school through daily supervision of students to determine with probable cause whether a student has violated a school policy or committed a crime. In fact, "[s]chool officials often are in 119 105 S. Ct. at 751 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 122 See Buss, supra note 27, at 752.
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a better position than law enforcement officers to identify, interpret and record the totality of circumstances necessary to establish probable cause" because school officials "can observe and supervise students" on a continuing basis. 123 Thus, the Court's use of a balancing test is unprecedented because searches conducted in public school do not demonstrate the special law enforcement needs which justify a fourth amendment standard less demanding than probable cause. Furthermore, the genuineness of the Court's belief that the maintenance of an educational environment justifies a less demanding standard is questionable, considering the Court has limited the application of the "reasonable grounds" standard to searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority.
124
By not extending the standard's application to searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, the Court is perpetuating a dual standard. Most state and federal courts have held that police participation in a school search will mandate the full constitutional safeguard of a warrant issued on probable cause. 125 If the maintenance of an educational atmosphere in public schools is a sufficient governmental interest to justify an exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement, any person who furthers the maintenance of that environment should be held to the same relaxed standard. Thus, the dual fourth amendment standard for school administrators and police officers, which results from the Court's limitation of the "reasonable grounds" standard to searches conducted by school officials acting alone, undermines the Court's justification that a "reasonable grounds" standard is necessary to maintain order in public schools.
In addition to being an unprecedented departure from the traditional probable cause standard, the Court's adoption of the "reasonable grounds" standard is inconsistent with the trend towards providing students full constitutional protection. The importance of providing students with the same constitutional protections as other persons was first articulated by the Court in Kent v. United States 1 26 "There is evidence.., that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults By adopting a fourth amendment standard less demanding than probable cause for searches conducted in public schools, the Court ignored its previous statements about the importance of safeguarding student's constitutional protections in the public schools. The Court's decisions in Tinker and Gault would seem to indicate that "the constraints on a student's liberty that result from compulsory attendance and institutional regulation would evoke a deep judicial concern for the student's rights to privacy as protected by the fourth amendment."' 13 2 The T.L.O. Court, however, did not demonstrate that judicial concern. Instead, the Court adopted a standard that provides students with less protection than adults or other children who are not in public schools.
The Court's justification for adopting the "reasonable grounds" standard was the important need to preserve order in the public schools.' 3 3 The Court's reliance on the need to maintain order in schools is nothing more than a return to the in loco parentis concept. Although the Court indicated that the in loco parentis theory did not exempt school officials from the fourth amendment requirements, the Court stated that school officials act as public officials as SUPREME COURT REVIEW well as surrogates for the parents.' 3 4 The Court therefore seems to be saying that while the in loco parentis theory does not make the fourth amendment inapplicable to school searches, the relationship between school officials and students may be considered in applying the "reasonable grounds" standard. 135 The implicit inclusion of the in loco parentis theory in the "reasonable grounds" standard adopted by the Court seriously minimizes the fourth amendment protection afforded to students in public schools. Courts applying a reasonableness standard influenced by the in loco parentis theory have consistently upheld searches conducted by school officials. the court stated that the in loco parentis power gave the school officials authority "to use moderate force to obtain obedience, including the force needed to search lockers."' 138 Moreover, courts adhering to the in loco parentis theory to apply a reasonableness standard very seldom discuss how the rights of students are protected. 13 9 Thus, the Court's adoption of the "reasonable grounds" standard seriously reduces students' fourth amendment protection and is an extreme departure from the Court's past willingness to protect the constitutional rights of students.
C. IMPACT OF THE "REASONABLE GROUNDS" STANDARD ON COURTS, SCHOOL OFFICIALS, AND STUDENTS
Even if the adoption of the "reasonable grounds" standard were not an unprecedented departure from the probable cause standard, the practical justifications for adopting the standard are not persuasive. In adopting the "reasonable grounds" standard, the Court stated that "the standard will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according Contrary to the Court's belief, the use of the "reasonable grounds" standard to assess the validity of searches conducted in public schools will actually cause confusion for both school officials and the courts. Unlike the probable cause standard, which has many court decisions and legal authorities defining its meaning,' 4 ' there is little authority available defining a "reasonable grounds" standard. 14 2 Furthermore, the authority that is available concerning the "reasonable grounds" standard reveals that the standard has been applied differently from one court to another.
The phrase "reasonable suspicion," another term used by courts to describe a standard less demanding than probable cause, was first announced by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Terry. Justice Douglas used it to describe the majority's standard for assessing the constitutional validity of "frisks" of dangerous criminals made by police officers.' 43 Since its inception in Terry, many courts faced with the issue of searches conducted in public schools have adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard as a middle ground between granting students full warrant and probable cause protection and completely denying them fourth amendment protection. Although the courts have used similar terminology to describe this relaxed standard, the application of the standard to searches conducted in public schools has been far from uniform. Courts have indicated that the level of suspicion required to satisfy the "reasonable suspicion" standard ranges from a "furtive gesture"' 4 4 to the need to show particular suspicion. It is entirely possible that there was reasonable suspicion, and even probable cause, based upon the facts, to believe that someone in the classroom had possession of the stolen money. There were no facts, however, which allowed the official particularize with respect to which students migfit possess the money, something which has time and again found to be necessary to a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 54 (emphasis in original).
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Many of the courts employing a "reasonable suspicion" standard have relied on the in loco parentis theory to justify a less rigorous standard than probable cause. 14 6 In determining whether "reasonable suspicion" exists, these courts have stated that "[t]he student's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure must be balanced with the necessity for the school officials .. . to fulfill their duties under the in loco parentis doctrine to protect the health and welfare of their students."' 147 Based on this balancing test, courts have frequently held that the core of privacy normally protected by the fourth amendment can be invaded by a school official acting in loco parentis. 1 48 The opinions of courts using a "reasonable suspicion" standard influenced by the in loco parentis theory, however, shed very little light on the meaning of "reasonable suspicion." Many courts simply emphasize the importance of the in loco parentis role of school officials without seriously considering other relevant factors which might argue for or against permitting a search. 149 Although presumably the facts in these opinions provide a clue to what level of suspicion is necessary to satisfy the "reasonable suspicion" stan- In Moore, the Court held that college administrators needed only "reasonable cause to believe," rather than the higher constitutional standard of probable cause, to justify a warrantless search of a student's dormitory room. The court stated that the less demanding standard was justified "because of the special necessities of the student-college relationship and because college disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings in the constitutional sense." Id. at 730. For a case which pushes the in locoparentis theory to an extreme, see Doe v. Henfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Tex. 1979) . In Doe, the court found that entry by school officials into classrooms with drugdetecting canines was justified under a reasonable suspicion standard influenced by the in loco parentis theory. The court indicated that although there was no specific information about the location of drugs, the search was reasonable because school officials were permitted to conduct wholesale searches and the dogs were simply used as aides to the school officials in their in loco parentis duty. Id. at 1022. The court further found that attention by the dogs to a particular student provided school officials with reasonable cause to justify a search of the student's pocket. Id. at 1024. The dog's attention to a particular student, however, did not "provide the necessary reasonable cause to believe the student actually possesse [ 5 ' the Court simply indicated that in light of the school official's in loco parentis duty to maintain order in the school, a vice principal had a reasonable suspicion that a student possessed drugs in his jacket. Other courts list factors such as the student's age, the nature of the alleged infraction, and the exigency to make the search without delay, finally failing to adequately explain how these factors relate to "reasonable suspicion."' 15 2 Thus, the case law concerning the "reasonable suspicion" standard fails to provide meaningful guidance to school officials in deciding whether a search is constitutional.
The T.L.O. Court, like the many state and federal courts which had previously used a reasonableness standard for searches in public schools, did not adequately explain what "reasonable grounds" means. In adopting the "reasonable grounds" standard, the Court simply stated that "[w]e join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that.., the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search."' 5 The Court then recited the facts of Mr. Choplick's search and concluded "that the search was in no sense unreasonable for fourth amendment purposes."' 54 Although the Court explained that "reasonable grounds" only requires sufficient probability, 5 5 the Court's analysis of the facts fails to give a clear meaning to the standard. In fact, the uncertain meaning of the "reasonable grounds" standard is demonstrated by the Court's admission that although the standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court was substantially the same as the standard adopted by the Court, the New Jersey Supreme Court's application of the standard to invalidate the search of T.L.O.'s purse reflected a "somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness."' 15 6 The opposite re-150 Buss, supra note 27, at 772. 151 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971). in finding that the principal had a reasonable suspicion, the court noted that the student was discovered out of class illegally and was also known to the vice principal to have experienced with drugs in the past. The court, however, never indicated why these facts satisfy the "reasonable suspicion" standard. According to Justice Brennan in his dissent, "the amorphous 'reasonableness under all the circumstances' standard freshly coined by the Court today will likely spawn increased litigation and greater uncertainty among teachers and administrators." 15 7 The probable impact of the uncertainty concerning the meaning of "reasonable grounds" is that school officials will be permitted to make unjustified searches in public schools. Courts applying a reasonableness standard to school searches rarely discuss how the standard is controlled to protect the student's privacy interest. 15 8 For instance, the T.L.O. Court simply concluded that the "reasonable grounds" standard will not "authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of school children" without seriously considering the harmful effect of unjustified invasions of students' privacy.' 5 9 Furthermore, under the "reasonable grounds" standard, the public school student is given very little fourth amendment protection, as the decisions of school officials to conduct searches under similar reasonableness standards have been upheld with extreme regularity. 160 Courts balancing a school official's interest in maintaining order against a student's legitimate expectations of privacy have almost always found that reasonable grounds for conducting a search exist. Thus, the "reasonable grounds" standard adopted by the Court fails to give serious consideration to the privacy interests of students and will probably result in unjustified searches by school officials.
D. ADEQUACY OF THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOL CONTEXT
The "reasonable grounds" standard adopted by the Court is a departure from the probable cause standard traditionally used to assess the constitutional validity of searches. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that by adopting the "reasonable 157 Id. at 756 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158 See Buss, supra note 27, at 772. According to Buss, "[t]he failure to discuss in detail how the standard of 'reasonable suspicion' is controlled to protect the student's privacy interests seems to reflect a more general failure to seriously consider the interest of the student who is charged with wrong doing, or the interest in privacy that he champions in his own self-interest." Id.
159 See 105 S. Ct. at 744. 160 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 135.
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grounds" standard, "the Court carve[d] out a broad exception to standards that this Court has developed over years of considering Fourth Amendment problems."' 6 1 To justify the "reasonable grounds" standard, the Court indicated that the "reasonable grounds" standard, as opposed to the traditional probable cause standard, is required because it is easier for school officials to understand and provides them with additional flexibility to preserve order in the public schools.' 6 2 Neither of these arguments are persuasive because the traditional fourth amendment probable cause standard, together with the isolated exceptions where probable cause is not required, adequately provide school officials with an effective and understandable means of maintaining order in public schools. The Court's first argument that the "reasonable grounds" standard was necessary because it is an easier standard for school officials to apply than the probable cause standard is inconsistent with previous statements made by the Court concerning the applicability of the probable cause standard. The Court first announced in Carroll v. United States 163 that law authorities have probable cause where "the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a criminal offense has occured."'6 In Brinegar v. United States,' 6 5 the Court indicated that "the rule of probable cause is a practical, non-technical conception" that depends upon "the factual and practical consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act."' 6 6 More recently, the Court explained that probable cause is a "common-sense" test that depends on an evaluation of the "totality of the circumstances" and is "practical," "fluid," "flexible," "easily applied," and "non-technical."' 67 These statements by the Court reveal that although school officials are not "legal technicians," they are capable of applying the traditional probable cause standard to determine whether a search of a student is valid under the fourth amendment.
The need to provide school officials with more flexibility to maintain order in the public schools than is provided by the tradi-161 105 S. Ct. at 750 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW tional probable cause standard is also an improper justification for the Court's adoption of the "reasonable grounds" standard. The traditional probable cause standard already provides school officials with the ability to maintain an educational atmosphere in public schools. School officials who suspect that a student has been violating a school policy or committing a crime can usually observe the student while he is in school to determine whether "the totality of circumstances" provide probable cause to confirm their suspicions.
8
Furthermore, although school searches will rarely fall within one of the recognized exceptions to probable cause,' 69 these exceptions provide school officials with a means of taking immediate action in certain situations where the school environment is threatened. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun indicated that "because drug use and possession of weapons have become increasingly common among young people, an immediate response frequently is required not just to maintain an environment conducive to learning, but to protect the very safety of students and school personnel." 170 Justice Blackmun then stated that the "reasonable grounds" standard is necessary because "[s]uch immediate action would not be possible if a teacher were required to serve a warrant before searching a student."' 17 Justice Blackmun's reasoning ignores that exceptions to the probable cause standard exist that could be applied in a school setting when immediate action is necessary.
One exception that could be used to justify school searches in situations where immediate action is required is the "plain view" doctrine. The "plain view" doctrine provides that "objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."' 7 2 Under the "plain veiw" doctrine, a school official who observes a student holding items such as drugs or dangerous weapons may seize these items without obtaining a warrant. 1 73 The
